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 Introduction1
With their campaigns against the entry of their country into the European Union in 1994, 
Norwegian women could not be blamed for a lack of humor: “Blondes never say no”, their 
posters joked, “except on the 28th of November”. A female leader of the Socialist Leftist Party 
explained why they turned the EU down: “We have studied the men from the 
EU-Commission in Brussels. They are neither sexy nor do they have money. No reason to 
vote yes.”2 The no’s won - and Norway stayed out of the EU. 1994 apparently was the year of 
the gender gap in Europe: it saw women not only in Norway, Sweden and Finland, but also in 
the twelve older member states outweigh men in skepticism on European unification. In the 
Swedish,  Finnish and Austrian referenda campaigns that same year, women’s organizations 
and female leaders broadly engaged in popular mobilizations against their country’s entry into 
the EU. Danish women voting against the Maastricht-treaty and those abstaining (44% 
respectively 21%) in the first Danish referendum, on June 2, 1992, were enough to make the 
treaty fail and to force their government and the Community to re-open negotiations3. 
Discrepancies between women’s and men’s support for European unification became manifest 
at an extremely high level (with a gap larger than 10%) not only in the new EU-member 
Sweden, or in Norway, but also for instance in Greece and France. In most of the other 
EU-countries the gender disparities ranged between 7 and 10% (Luxemburg, Ireland, UK, 
Portugal, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Italy). Only in  Spain and the Netherlands, women and 
                                               
1 The idea for this study was conceived for my commentary to the conference “Varieties of Europe”, at the NYU/Deutsches 
Haus, New York, in January 1996; I articulated it first in my paper “A gender gap in the European Union? Exploring patterns 
of female support to European integration”, for the interdisciplinary conference “A World in Transition: Feminist 
Perspectives on International Relations”, University of Lund, Sweden, June 1996; I further revised this paper for a 
presentation under the title “What the European Union means to Women” at the Institute for European Studies, Cornell 
University, in November 1996.  I am grateful to Hermann Schmitt (ZEUS, Mannheim) for providing me, despite and because 
of his doubts, with the stimulus to start this research as well as with Eurobarometer data analyses; Manfred Küchler helped 
me with some of the inevitable trials and errors of any quantitative data analysis, as well as with criticism in the early stages; 
and I benefited from Karlheinz Reif’s and Ana Melich’s helpfulness in providing me with surveys, conducted by the DG10 of 
the EU-Commission. I felt encouraged to pursue my argument by Philippe C. Schmitters comments, and I want to thank 
Minna Gillberg, Celia Valiente, Chiara Saraceno, Herbert Doering, Jonas Pontusson, Mary Katzenstein and Peter Katzenstein 
for many stimulating suggestions, more than I was able to incorporate into my research at its current stage that this working 
paper reflects. 
2 Reinhard Wolff: “Blondinen sagen fast niemals nein”, in “TAZ”, Nov. 26, 1994: 11 
3 The overall outcome of the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht treaty were 40% yes, 42% no, and 18% abstentions; 
women voted with 35% yes (men 47%), with 44% no (men 38%), and 21% of the women abstained (men 15%); cf. Drude 
Dahlerup: Demokratiets fremtid I et europaeisk kvindeperspektiv; in KVINFO, Kvindeoffentlighed I Europa, Copenhagen 
1996: 53 
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 men in their EU-support appeared to differ hardly (cf. Table 1: Gender disparities in public 
EU-support 1994).  
 
Table 1: Gender disparities in public EU-support, 1994 (%)4
  wome
n 
Men differenc
e 
high (>10%) Denmark 22.2 38.9 16.7 
 Greece 35.1 46.4 11.3 
 Norway 13.1 24.1 11.0 
 Sweden 16.3 26.7 10.4 
 France 21.2 31.4 10.2 
Medium(5-10%) Luxemburg 50.7 60.5  9.8 
 Ireland 45.3 54.7  9.4 
 UK 15.2 24.1  8.9 
 Portugal 20.4 28.9  8.5 
 Germany West 30.9 38.6  7.7 
 Finland 21.8 29.2  7.4 
 Austria 20.5 27.7  7.2 
 Germany East 20 27.1  7.1 
 Belgium 21 27.6  6.6 
 Italy 35.7 42.3  6.6 
low (< 5%) Spain 16.4 20.3  3.9 
 Netherlands 31.9 35.3  3.4 
Source: 
EBFall/1994 
                                               
4 Since 1981, Eurobarometer measures public support to the EC/EU by asking four questions: “In general, are you for or 
against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?”; “Would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not 
from being a member of the EU?”; “Do you think that (your country’s) membership of the EU is a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad?”; “If you were told tomorrow that the EU had been scraped, would you be very sorry about it?” 
The %-values in Table 1 indicate the proportion of respondents that answered all four questions positively.  
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  Do these data indicate the emergence of a “gender gap” in European politics? How 
could such a gap be accounted for? 5
 The development of mass popular opposition against the EU and, more particularly, 
the apparent gendering of Euro-skepticism, challenge a number of hypotheses and 
expectations commonly held by analysts of European integration and of the dynamics of 
public support for Europe: 
 1.  The strengthening of public skepticism and opposition against the European Union 
contradicts any earlier assumption of a vast public “permissive consensus” in favor of 
European unification serving to facilitate conditions for the building of the Community 
(Lindberg/Scheingold 1970). As a consequence of the transformation of “nation states” into 
“member states” that has characterized the evolution of the European Community, the 
controversies around the Maastricht treaty have provoked a politicization of European mass 
publics that appears irreversible (Sbragia 1994)6. The politicization of citizens in Europe has 
not only been conducive to “bringing public opinion back in” to the research agenda on 
European integration (Sinnott 1995); but has also brought to light questions of gender and 
their impact on public opinion relevant to EU-politics.  
 2.  The emergence of a gendered mass public opinion on issues of European integration 
appears particularly at odds with those views that consider gender differences in “analyzing 
attitudes, opinions and values in Western industrialized countries in the year 2000" as “a topic 
without a future”.7 The most prominent explanations for the dynamics of public support for 
Europe draw on structural variables such as domestic economic conditions, the EC’s economic 
record and national benefits deriving from membership (Anderson/Kaltenthaler 1996; 
Anderson/Reichert 1996); individual characteristics such as occupation, income, age group, 
                                               
5 A gender gap was first discovered in U.S. politics during the 1980 presidential elections that brought Ronald Reagan to 
power, and since then has given rise to an ever expanding literature, see Carol M. Mueller (ed.) 1988.  
6 Before Maastricht, national and supranational political, administrative, judicial and business elites were conceived as the 
crucial players in negotiating the coordination and communitarization of national public policies and in promoting their 
“spill-overs” to always new domains; see: Alberta Sbragia: “From ‘Nation-State’ to ‘Member State’: the Evolution of the 
European Community”; in P.M.Luetzeler, Europe after Maastricht. American and European Perspectives, 
Providence/Oxford 1994: 69-88; id. (ed.), Euro-Politics. Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community; 
Washington 1992 
7 Although Marita Rosch Inglehart concludes with the optimistic expectation that “in so far as structural variables and 
individual factors change towards equality for men and women, the less interesting research on gender differences will be”, she 
makes some useful suggestions for improving survey research questions on that topic; see M.R.Inglehart: “Gender Differences 
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 values and voting intention (Inglehart/Rabier/Reif 1987), or, in a process-perspective, the 
length of membership in the EC and demographic replacement (Wessels 1995). If, however, 
gender differences should prove to be a significant determinant for EU-support among 
European mass publics, it follows among others that - in contrast, for instance, to Dalton’s  
and Eichenberg’s (1993) earlier prediction - the successful fighting of economic recession -- be 
it by implementing the Single European market or by introducing the “Euro” -- could no 
longer be expected to figure as the principle rationale for citizens maintaining or even 
increasing their support for the EU. 
 3.  Finally, the discovery of a gender gap in EU-support contrasts with the expectation 
that women should develop more positive attitudes towards the EU, given the range of 
women friendly policies adopted by the EC since the mid-seventies. In her assessments of 
EC-social policies, Beverly Springer for instance concluded that EC has been “instrumental in 
advancing the interests of working women” (Springer 1992: 65). While admitting that the 
social dimension of the EU has remained rudimentary compared to the initiatives taken for 
reinforcing market integration in Europe, Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson similarly argued 
that “the Union has established important social regulations - including protections and 
benefits for women workers that are sometimes far more extensive than those offered in the 
United States” (Pierson/Leibfried 1995:3), with the European Court of Justice playing a 
particularly activist role (Leibfried/ Pierson 1995: 47). Catherine Hoskyns, too, has argued 
that the European Community’s policy on women’s rights since the 1970s “has provided a 
rare example of a European policy which grants social rights and engages at least to some 
extent with a mobilised political community”, namely women’s organizations8. If women 
were aware of these achievements, wouldn’t they  rather welcome further integration? 
 The literature on gender and public opinion suggests three possible explanations for 
resolving this puzzle of the unexpected gender discrepancies in public EU-support, and, more 
specifically, for accounting for women’s more skeptical and negative orientations:  From a 
traditional standpoint, European women’s support for the EU might be seen to lag behind 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Sex-Role Attitudes: A Topic Without a Future”? In K.Reif/ R. Inglehart: “Eurobarometer. The Dynamics of European 
Public Opinion”; St. Martin’s Press 1991: 187-200  
8 See: Catherine Hoskyns: “Integrating Gender. Women, Law and Politics in the European Union”; London, New York, 
Verso 1996 
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 that of men because women either continue to be less interested in politics in general, and in 
European politics in particular, or they tend to endorse more strongly conservative, 
nationalist and hence anti-European positions. A second argument would see the “EU-gender 
gap” as an ephemeral artifact resulting from the unstable and ambiguous “nature and origins of 
mass opinion” (Zaller 1992) and from individual preference statements that respondents to 
survey questionnaires typically construct “on the fly”. In the first two sections,  I will discuss 
these two views, point out some of the empirical contradictions of the “female deficit 
hypothesis”, and outline why  the EU-gender gap appears to be more than an ephemeral 
artifact. In the last three sections, I will develop an  alternative account of the motivations and 
meanings underlying the gender disparities in public orientations toward European 
integration. With my argument I will draw on the theory of “relative deprivation”, 
interpreting feminist critiques of the EU as “relative deprivation discourses” and  women’s 
comparatively stronger Euro-skepticism correspondingly motivated by the perception that the 
project of European unification will entail backlashes with regard to their current position and 
opportunities at the national and local level.  
 
The gender gap in EU-support - women’s “deficit”? 
 Since the appearance of Maurice Duverger’s “The Political Role of Women” (1955) and 
Seymour M. Lipset’s “The Political Man” (1960)9, there has been a broad acceptance of the 
“female deficit”- thesis in the comparative literature on political behavior. Its underlying 
assumptions are twofold: that women are either more apolitical, or, if they become politicized,  
more conservative than men10. Does this conventional wisdom still apply to the majority of 
women in the Europe of the nineties, i.e., does the emerging gender gap in public opinion on 
the European Union have its origin either in a deficit of political interest and information, or 
in a conservative bias on the part of European women? In public opinion research on Western 
Europe, the pioneers of the “Civic Culture Study” (1959), Almond and Verba, have laid the 
                                               
9 Maurice Duverger found that in Norway, France and Germany women and men usually voted on the same lines, but where 
there was divergence, women voted more strongly for right-wing parties; similar patterns were found for Greece, Belgium, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Britain and Italy; see Pippa Norris 1988: 218f.. Seymour M. Lipset reported 
that women were an important source of political and moral conservatism and for rightist political parties; see 
Jelen/Thomas/Wilcox 1994: 171. 
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 ground for the dichotomous image of “public man, private woman”. In their exploration of 
the forms of political participation in the fifties, the authors reported large differences in 
political activism between men and women (Almond/Verba 1959: 70). Two decades later, the 
“Political Action Study” -- analyzing wider forms of political action in the seventies – still 
concluded that conventional political participation was “most heavily influenced by sex” 
(Marsh/Kaase 1979: 106). Russell Dalton agreed with them insofar as he found that “men are 
more politically active than women in virtually all Western democracies” (Dalton 1988: 49). 
Confirming the same position, Jan Van Deth observed in his study “Continuities in Political 
Action” that women showed less interest in politics because of persisting traditional gender 
roles that define women as unpolitical (Van Deth 1989). Assuming that “men always show 
more interest in public affairs than women do”, Van Deth conceived sex – in addition to 
education and age – as a relevant predictor of political interest in Western Europe (Van Deth 
1991: 208). An underlying assumption in all major studies, from the analysis of “Civic 
Culture” (1959) and the “Political Action Study” (1973-6) to the “European Values Survey” 
(1981) and the “Continuities in Political Action” (1989), is the notion that European women 
have remained less interested in and also more apathetic toward politics.11 From this 
“traditional gender gap” perspective, the disparities in public EU-support appear as just 
manifestation more of the general pattern of diverging interests between the sexes. The 
Eurobarometer special opinion poll on “Women and men in Europe and equal opportunities” 
(1997) can be cited for most recent evidence: it demonstrates that more women than men 
admittedly suffered from a lack of political information, even on those specific national and 
EC-policies that should be in their proper interest12.  
                                                                                                                                                        
10 M.Goot/E.Reid: “Women if not apolitical, then conservative”, in J. Siltanen/M. Stanworth (eds.), “Women and the Public 
Sphere”, Hutchinson 1984 
11 Kaase and Barnes in their distinction of four modes of political involvement define “political apathy” as “no interest and no 
action”, and “political detachment” as “interest but no action”; cf. Kaase/Barnes 1979; taking issue with the “traditional gender 
gap”-thesis, Marita Rosch Inglehart argued that gender was rather “a topic without a future” (M.R.Inglehart, in Reif/Inglehart 
eds., 1991). 
12 This EB-report about a survey conducted in 1996 demonstrated that although nearly half of the respondents were in favor 
of  equal opportunities, only a minority appeared to be informed about existing national laws and European measures for 
promoting them. Especially women were found unaware of the existence of this type of legislation in greater numbers than 
men: “This ignorance of Community activities and of national legislation has, regrettably, increased over recent years and the 
number of Europeans who think that the Union is dealing with equality issues is hardly greater than it was in 1983" (EB 44.3, 
Brussels 1997: 15/6). 
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  Since the mid-1980s, feminist scholars have challenged the “female deficit” thesis of 
women’s political behavior on conceptual as well as empirical grounds13. For a number of 
arguments that draw on structural analyses of European “post-industrial” politics, on large 
scale European public opinion research, and on gender and women’s studies, this traditional 
view appears particularly questionable if applied to the EU-gender gap:  1. socio-economic and 
political “gender advancement” has been identified as the most prominent feature of 
modernization in European post-industrial societies in the past two decades; 2. in this process, 
women have become undeniably politicized, with gender disparities rapidly narrowing and 
disappearing in all major dimensions of political attitudes and areas of political behavior; 3. In 
a number of European countries, the traditional gender gap has even been reversed, with more 
women than men shifting progressively towards liberal and leftist positions, on the political 
spectrum as well as on policy-issues: 
 
Structural gender advancement in European post-industrial societies 
In their comparative analysis of social structural convergence processes in Europe, Jan-Erik 
Lane and Svante O. Ersson argued that “gender-related developments” represented the most 
characteristic aspects of the post-industrial societies emerging in Europe, although with some 
cross-national variations14.  Assuming that “gender advancement” represented the most 
prominent measure for modernization, they proceeded to use the UN- “gender 
empowerment-index” to demonstrate that the Northern European countries (Finland, 
Norway, Sweden) were the most “modern” ones, and core EC countries such as France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries more advanced compared to the other EC countries 
such as the UK, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (cf.: Table 2: “Gender related 
development”) 15. 
                                               
13 For an earlier critical discussion of this traditional image of the apolitical woman see Joni Lovenduski: “Patterns of 
Women’s Political Behavior”, 1986: 117ff.; for an overview on the feminist critiques of “mainstream political science 
approaches” developed since the 1970s in the U.S., see Susan J. Carroll and Linda M.G. Zerilli: Feminist Challenges to 
Political Science; in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline II; APSA 1993: 55-76 
14 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson: European Politics. An Introduction; Sage 1996: 61-63 
15 See Lane/ Ersson 1996: 61. However, their indicators appear conceptually and normatively rather questionable: defining 
“gender advancement” as “pressures upon traditional family values”, they use indicators such as “divorce rates”, “children 
born outside of marriage” and “suicide rates”(!) for measuring it. For alternative conceptions and measures of “family friendly” 
welfare systems and gender regimes, see: Diane Sainsbury ed. 1994; Sainsbury 1996. 
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 Table 2: Gender-related development  and  empowerment16
 GDI 
1990/2 
GEM 
1992/4 
Sweden 0.919 0.757 
Finland 0.918 0.722 
Norway 0.911 0.752 
Denmark 0.904 0.683 
France 0.898 0.433 
Austria 0.882 0.610 
UK 0.862 0.483 
Italy 0.861 0.585 
Belgium 0.852 0.479 
Netherlands 0.851 0.625 
Portugal 0.832 0.435 
Greece 0.825  -  
Ireland 0.813 0.469 
Spain 0.795 0.452 
Luxemburg 0.790 0.542 
Source: UN Human Development Report 1995: 76, 84 
 
 Although their claim that the modernization of gender relations correlated “neatly” 
with the advancement of political gender equality measured by women’s share in parliament 
seats and of ministers (Lane/Ersson 1996: 62) may be questioned in the light of striking 
anomalies, such as France, the U.S. or the UK, it is more important that their general 
argument throws into question the validity of  the “female deficit” hypothesis: it is 
counterintuitive to assume that the Nordic and core European countries would have brought 
about high standards of “gender advancement” in terms of socio-economic as well as in 
                                               
16 “GDI”, the “gender-related development index”, includes measures of women’s “share of earned income”, “life expectancy”, 
“adult literacy rate” and “combined school enrollment rate”; “GEM”, the “gender empowerment measure” includes women’s 
share of seats held in parliament, “administrative and management personnel”; “professional and technical workers”; and 
“earned  income share” (by 1990-94); see: Human Development Report 1995, New York/ Oxford 1995  
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 political equality, with women remaining politically more apathetic and detached than men.  
Still, Lane’s and Ersson’s gender modernization thesis would suggest to reconduce the large 
disparities in Euro-skepticism found among women and men in Greece, Portugal, Italy or 
Ireland to the relatively low level of “gender advancement” found in these countries, by this 
confirming partially the traditional hypothesis. As I shall demonstrate below, there is evidence 
enough to question the validity of this explanation regarding the Southern and Western 
European periphery.   
 
The disappearing gender gap in political participation 
 The comprehensive study of the changing relationships between “Citizens and the 
State” in  European societies (Klingemann/Fuchs eds. 1995) provides findings that put the 
traditional wisdom about a gender gap in political behavior not only in the “gender advanced” 
areas, but also in Southern Europe into question. In his comparative empirical analysis of 
electoral participation, Richard Topf finds a “counter-intuitive” and “clear trend towards equal 
electoral participation, and sometimes even higher participation among women than among 
men”17. Regarding other  forms of political involvement beyond electoral participation, for 
instance levels of political discussion, Topf reports gender differences to be narrowing in all 
EC countries, at an “increasing rate”, leading “possibly even towards the elimination of gender 
differences altogether by the mid-1990s” (Topf 1995b: 63). While he finds Ireland, Belgium and 
Germany to have achieved some progress between 1973 and 1991 with regard to leveling 
gender differences in political behavior, and Denmark, France and Italy to have achieved more 
progress, Greece has demonstrated by far the highest levels of female and male involvement in 
political discussion (Topf 1995: 64): Although in Greece structural gender equality appears to 
be lagging behind other European countries, in the relatively short time span of Greek’s 
transition to and consolidation of a new democratic regime, behavioral gender patterns have 
changed here more quickly than in any of the other countries of Central and Northern 
Europe.  
                                               
17 Richard Topf finds in the late 1980s a “slightly greater likelihood of men voting in Germany, but a modestly higher 
proportion of women stated they had voted in Britain, Spain, and Portugal”. Pointing to the “modest demographic gender 
ratio in favor of women”, he argues that “the absence of a gender skew in electoral participation means that, in absolute 
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 The reversal of the gender gap in  political interest, alignment and policy issue positions 
 Questioning the received wisdom on women’s deficit of political interest further, 
Carina Lundmark, in her analysis of EB-data from 1975 - 1983, demonstrated that while 
differences between men’s and women’s political interests continued to exist, at the same time 
it was true that “high political interest is much more often found among feminist women than 
among men of masculine orientation and easily matches that among traditionalist men. 
Moreover  a feminist orientation goes along with higher levels of political interest among both 
men and women”. Increases of political interest among feminist women urged her to expect in 
the future the influence of the women’s movement to spread, “bringing more women into the 
political arena”18.  
 
 Researchers challenged not only the traditional “apolitical women” view, but the 
“female conservatism”-hypothesis as well: Ronald Inglehart (1977) found that a greater female 
conservatism among women by no means was characteristic of all western democracies, but 
that it was more pronounced only in countries such as France, Belgium and Italy. For the UK, 
Pippa Norris  questioned the relationship between women and conservatism with her striking 
discovery of the “reversed gender gap”, namely the liberal-leftist turn of women in the 1983 
British general elections (Norris 1986). In a comparative analysis of 1983 Eurobarometer data, 
she found that women and men in the ten EC-member states in general were very similar in 
their voting behavior but differed significantly in some of their issue-preferences. In contrast 
to the developments in the U.S. during the 1980s, women in Europe -- with the exception of 
Danish and younger women – appeared neither more conservative nor more supportive of 
Communist and Socialist parties. In their policy preferences, however, Norris discovered a 
“potential gender gap”, “with European women being more left wing than men on a range of 
issues”19. Compared to their more progressive positions in concrete policy questions, however, 
women continued to maintain a more conservative stance in their ideological 
                                                                                                                                                        
numerical terms, somewhat more women than men may be expected to vote in national elections”; see R. Topf : Electoral 
Participation; in Klingemann/Fuchs (eds.), Citizens and the State; Oxford University Press 1995: 47. 
18 Carina Lundmark: Feminist Political Orientations; in Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (eds.), The Impact of Values; 
Oxford University Press 1995: 271/2 
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 self-identification. This was the paradoxical result of David De Vaus’ and Ian McAllister’s 
(1989) analysis of the changing patterns of women’s political alignment in eleven nations: 
Women in all countries -- with the exception of Australia -- at the beginning of the 1980s 
identified themselves as more conservative than men20. This traditional gender gap 
disappeared, however, if workforce participation, religiosity and other situational and 
structural factors were controlled for and the gender gap accordingly “decomposed” . Under 
the same structural and situational conditions, the gender gap reversed in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, where women turned out to be more leftist oriented.  Concluding, the authors 
predicted a conditional reversal of the gender gap, depending on changes of “those positional 
and structural factors with the potential to fundamentally alter the politics of women in 
advanced industrial society”21.   
 
 Ted Jelen, Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (1994) have addressed the apparent paradox 
posed by  Pippa Norris’ findings on women being more progressive on policy issues on the 
one hand, and by DeVaus/Allister’s evidence that women still remained more conservative in 
their political alignment, on the other. In their “synthesis” Jelen et al. argue that the left-right 
continuum appears to have a different meaning for men and for women: Women seem much 
more likely to regard the left-right space as referring to ‘preservationist’ values of religion and 
cultural homogeneity, and men conceptualize the left-right space in economic and ‘New 
Politics’ terms. These differences in women’s and men’s values were independent of economic 
factors, hence did not appear to be a product of women’s socio-economic disadvantages22. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 Pippa Norris concludes “that European women and men have different values concerning certain issues such as nuclear 
power, unemployment, defense and concern for environment” (id. 228), and she interprets these differences as “a potential for 
a women’s vote in future European elections” (Norris 1988: 222). 
20 De Vaus and McAllister use data from the European, Australian and American Values Studies of the early 1980s on political 
self-placement along the left-right continuum and across 11 advanced industrial societies; see DeVaus/McAllister: The 
changing politics of women: gender and political alignment in 11 nations; in: European Journal of Political Research 1989: 
241-262 
21 It can be concluded from their study that since the structural conditions of women in all European countries have changed 
considerably during the 1980s and 1990s, including also catholic societies with a strong female conservatism in the past, Pippa 
Norris’ hypothesis on the “reversed gender gap” with women becoming more liberal and leftist increasingly gains plausibility. 
But a broader comparative assessment based on more recent data is lacking.  
22 Ted G. Jelen, Sue Thomas, Clyde Wilcox: The gender gap in comparative perspective. Gender differences in abstract 
ideology and concrete issues in Western Europe; in European Journal of  Political Research 25/1994: 183. 
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  Summarizing these various analyses of the impact of gender on political behavior,  it is 
clear that the disagreements among scholars about the significance, varieties, and causes of the 
“gender gap” in European political behavior are far from being resolved. Cumulative 
comparative, conceptual and empirical research shows severe gaps regarding more recent 
developments during the 1990s. What becomes clear by scrutinizing the discussion on 
developments during the 1980s, however, is that the traditional gender gap hypothesis in 
Europe - although not belonging wholly to the past - is challenged by a number of empirical 
findings and more sophisticated methods of data analyses: the gender gap hypothesis has been 
decomposed, allowing one to identify the structural trends that increasingly undermine it; 
feminist research has presented evidence for a reversal of the gender gap with feminists 
becoming more politicized than traditional men, and women turning progressively more 
liberal than men; and a third stream of research denies the significance of gender for predicting 
political attitudes and behavior altogether or, at least, provides evidence for its rapid decline. 
While all three competing views can claim legitimacy within the terms of their different 
perspectives and conceptualizations and on the basis of the limited data they use, they severely 
revise but ultimately do not replace the traditional “female deficit” and “female conservatism” 
hypotheses for explaining gender discrepancies in public attitudes towards the European 
Union. The more complex and paradoxical the pattern of gender discrepancies in political 
orientations becomes, the more puzzling appears the EU-gender gap. 
 
 
The gender gap in EU-public support - an ephemeral “artifact”?  
 In his study “The nature and origins of mass opinion” John R. Zaller (1992) rejected 
the “fixed position” assumption common to most opinion analysts according to which survey 
researchers observe the final results of some process of opinion formation that occurred before 
they came on the scene. Referring to the multitude of empirical response anomalies, Zaller 
draws on findings of cognitive psychology for arguing that individuals rarely have fixed 
attitudes on specific issues; rather, “they construct variable ‘preference statements’ on the fly 
as they confront each issue raised” (Zaller 1992: 76ff.) In constructing their responses to survey 
questionnaires, people draw on rather ambivalent attitudes deriving from their conflicting 
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 considerations, with a large range of values and priorities that potentially could become 
relevant, while he/she consults only one or a few. In this “constructivist” perspective, citizen’s 
preference statements are intrinsically unstable, with the dynamics of mass opinion on any 
given issue over time depending on the “role of the political elites in establishing the terms of 
political discourse in the mass media and the powerful effect of this framing of issues” (id. 
310ff.).  
 
 A consequence of this methodological critique for the hypothesis of the EU-gender gap 
is that the analysis should not be restricted to quantitative survey data of one source alone, 
because these could indicate gender discrepancies of only a limited, unstable and inconsistent 
nature. If examined across a broader range of issues and behaviors, over time and by using 
qualitative sources on women’s perspectives on Europe, these differences might well show 
little consistency. Without being able to demonstrate the persistence of gender differences on 
EU-issues over time and their consistency with attitudes on related issues within the national 
and cross-national contexts of political discourses, an “EU-gender gap” would be no more than 
an artifact produced by the techniques of EB-opinion pollsters.  
 
 In addressing these concerns, I will make three arguments: First, I have already pointed 
to the growing evidence that gender disparities in European public opinion are not limited to 
the issue of EU-support - they are but one manifestation of a broader range of gender 
differences including policy issues and, to a minor degree,  also voting behavior in European 
referenda and elections as well as party-political orientations. Second, regarding the context of 
the old and new gender discrepancies in political attitudes and behavior,  feminist values 
appear to be changing increasingly larger shares of European gender cultures. Third, the 
gender gap on the issue of European integration can be shown to have persisted at least since 
the beginning of the 1980s. While I have already discussed some manifestations of the gender 
gap in the section above, in the following I will develop the argument about the feminist 
subculture and on the continuity of the EU-gender gap over time.  
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 Feminist values and changes of  masculine and traditional gender cultures 
 Since the mid-1970s, masculine and traditional gender cultures have undergone 
manifest changes and given rise to “an identifiable feminist political culture” throughout 
Europe23. When in 1983 respondents were asked whether they thought the position of women 
in society was a problem, and whether they rejected the belief that politics should be left to 
men, sizable minorities of up to 22% agreed with these feminist positions. When asked again 
in 1990-1 by the World Value Survey, already more than a third of respondents supported 
“feminist values”, now defined as preferences for “non-preferential employment practices for 
men”, for jobs “as the best way for a women to be independent” and for supporting “the 
women’s movement”. Although it can be argued that feminists are notably more likely to 
hold postmaterialist values, and that this is true for feminist men as much as for feminist 
women24, on the other hand women and men by no means support feminist values in equal 
proportions: the gap between the proportion of feminist men and the larger proportion of  
feminist women, initially existing in 1975, has not diminished over the following years but 
appears to have grown larger25.  
 
                                               
23 Feminist orientations have been defined as implying not only a perception of women as an underprivileged group, but also a 
desire to see present society transformed, although including different strategies toward this goal; see: Carina Lundmark, 1995: 
269 
24 B.C.Hayes, I.McAllister, D.T.Studlar, “Gender, Feminism and Postmaterialist Attitudes: A Cross-National Analysis”; Paper 
prepared for APSA, San Francisco, August 29-Sept.1, 1996: 15 
25 For an analysis of gender and national variations in support for gender equality, see Clyde Wilcox: Support for gender 
equality in West Europe; in European Journal of Political Research 20, 1991: 144 
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 Table 3: Feminist values in Western Europe26
  a) 1975 b) 1983 c) 1990/1 n 1990/1 
High Sweden - - 42.2 874 
>35% Norway - - 41.9 1.175 
 Denmark 15 14 37.5 885 
      
Medium Ireland 25 12 33.9 976 
>25% 
<35% 
Spain 
W-Germany 
- 
9 
- 
8 
32.2 
34.5 
3.768 
1.841 
 Great Britian 14 8 34.3 1.402 
 France 24 15 30.9 935 
 Netherlands 6 7 30.6 965 
 Finland   29.3 587 
      
Low Portugal   24.8 1.185 
<25% Belgium 9 4 24.6 2.521 
 Italy 24 22 21.9 1.928 
 Austria 
Greece 
 
 
 
22 
21.8 
n.v. 
1463 
 
 
Sources:  
a),b): Eurobarometer, Nos. 3, 19 (Lundmark 1995: 267); 
c) World Values Survey, 1990-1991(3 questions, see FN; own calculation) 
n.v.: no values 
 
The impact of changes in gender cultures on mass political attitudes are still underresearched. 
Different varieties of feminist political orientation will have a differing impact on women’s 
and men’s “beliefs in government” - including national as well as supranational state 
institutions - as we might expect, depending among others on the strength and type of “state 
                                               
26 Indicators for “feminist values” were positive answers to the following questions: “The position of women in society is a 
problem”; “politics should not be left to men” (1975, 1983); “non-preferential employment practices for men”; “job as the best 
way for a women to be independent”; and “support of the women’s movement” (1990-1). 
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 feminism”27. Until these research lacunae are addressed, my argument here has to limit itself to 
pointing out the dynamic impact of feminist political values that since the mid-seventies have 
transformed traditional gender cultures in Europe and politicized traditional political cultures. 
 
 
The persisting gender disparities in public EU-support (1983-1995) 
 Gender disparities in public EU-support in all EC-countries – according to EB-survey 
data -- have varied, but on the whole persisted at least since 1983. Over time they have 
diminished - in spite of the integration of new member states with larger differences among 
women’s and men’s attitudes towards the EU, such as Sweden and Austria in 199528. Within 
this generally convergent trend, however, gender gaps have not declined in that time period in 
all EU-countries: on the contrary, in a number of them, the distances between men’s and 
women’s preferences regarding the topic of European integration seems to have grown larger 
(see table 4: The EU-gender gap 1983, 1990, 1995 by member state): 
 
 Among the twelve member states where EB has conducted surveys since 1983, national 
gender gaps in EU-support appear to have declined more than the average in Greece, Italy, 
Germany, France, the UK (from 1990-1995) and Ireland. Minor decreases have occurred in 
Luxemburg and Spain as well as in Denmark, but here only until 1990. Widening gender 
disparities have accompanied the erosion of mass public consensus for European integration 
after 199129, especially in five countries: Between 1983 and 1995, the gender gaps have grown 
larger above all in the Netherlands and in Belgium and to a minor degree in Portugal. And 
bringing the processes of convergence to a halt, in 1990, the discrepancies between men’s and 
women’s political stances have increased in the UK and in Denmark. 
                                               
27 For a comparative assessment on the types of state feminism, see: Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G.Mazur, eds.: 
Comparative State Feminism; Sage 1995 
28 From the four EFTA-countries where referenda for EU-membership were held in 1994, EB-surveys show that in three of 
them (Norway, Austria, Sweden), the gender gap in public EU-support in 1994 was larger, while in Finland it was at about the 
average of the older memberstates. 
29 Still in 1989, the ratio between supporters of European integration who believed that their country benefited from 
membership and opponents who denied this, was 60%:25%. In 1993, both groups with around 45% of EB-respondents had 
become equally strong; see EB 43, Autumn 1995: VIII). 
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  These developments do not only show that gender disparities in EU-support are hardly 
a new and even less an ephemeral phenomenon. Their variations over time and across the 
European societies also raise the question as to why women in relation to men in some 
countries rather than in others have developed more negative or skeptical attitudes toward the 
question of  European integration over the course of the last fifteen years. In the countries 
where the gender gaps have narrowed, and women’s and men’s political behavior and attitudes 
generally have converged, the structural advancement of gender equality might account for 
one part of this process, and women’s politicization and better information on particular 
EC-policies for promoting gender equality for another.  But  what about those societies where 
gender gaps during the eighties and nineties have not declined but have grown larger?  
 
Table 4: Variations of the EU-gender gap 1983- 1995 
 Country GG 1983 GG 1990 GG 1995 differ. 
Growth Netherlands 0.30 0.39 0.50  0.20 
 Belgium 0.27 0.18 0.38  0.11 
 Denmark 0.53 0.46 0.59  0.06 
      
persistence Portugal  0.25 0.29  0.04  
 UK 0.31 0.49 0.29 -0.02 
 Luxembourg 0.26  0.22 -0.04 
 Spain  0.25 0.21 -0.04 
      
decline Ireland 0.41  0.22 -0.19 
 France 0.40 0.19 0.11 -0.29 
 Germany W 0.34 0.16 0.04 -0.30 
 Greece 0.66 0.33 0.33 -0.33 
 Italy 0.45 0.40 0.12 -0.33 
      
 
Source: EB19, EB33, EB43.1; analyses provided by ZEUS, Mannheim 
Note: the values represent the difference between male and female support indices (0-4) 
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 Denmark and the UK after 1990, and the Netherlands and Belgium since 1983 are anomalous 
cases that contradict  the “gender convergence” thesis. For constructing a general explanation 
of the EU-gender gap that would account also for these “anomalous” cases, we need to address 
more subtle questions on the dynamics of mass public opinion. In an argument limited 
primarily to quantitative survey data, these “interpretive” dimensions  remain excluded.   
 
 
The EU-gender gap in the theoretical framework of “relative deprivation”  
 My argument developed so far has been that discrepancies between female and male 
political attitudes toward European integration can neither be reduced to the traditional 
“female deficit” or “conservatism” hypotheses, nor can they be considered as a transitory 
phenomenon or mere “artifact”. I have demonstrated that, with variations, they have persisted 
over time and thus are part of a more complex and changing pattern of gender disparities 
regarding policy preferences, political behavior and political values. I will now continue to 
explore an alternative approach for explaining the discrepancies of women’s and men’s 
orientations toward the EU - the theory of “relative deprivation”. Pippa Norris in her 
comparative analysis of the gender gap has suggested that this theory be used to explain the 
voting-gender gap30. Developed in the 1960s by social psychologists, the relative deprivation 
theory has served to explain “why men rebel”, as much as the behavior of working men and 
working women31. Thus it would seem promising as a means to explore some of the complex 
motivations underlying the gender gap in EU- politics, too. 
 In this section, I will first outline briefly the basic concepts and assumptions of this 
theory as a framework for developing more specific propositions on the EU-gender gap. Then, 
second, I will articulate this explanatory perspective with current feminist critiques of the EU 
and their role in framing women’s relative deprivation within the context of European 
integration.  
                                               
30 My proposal to apply the theory of relative deprivation to the analysis of the gender gap in EU-public support draws on 
Pippa Norris’ comparative analysis of the voting gender gap in the U.S. and in Europe; see: Pippa Norris, “The Gender Gap: 
A Cross-National Trend?” in Carol M. Mueller, ed., “The Politics of the Gender Gap. The Social Construction of Influence”, 
Sage 1988: 217ff. 
31 See: Ted R.Gurr, Why Men R, Princeton 1970; W.G.Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London 1966; 
F.Crosby, Relative Deprivation and Working Women, New York 1982 
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 Basic concepts of a “relative deprivation” theory of  the EU-gender gap 
  “Relative deprivation” (RD) -- as distinct from conditions of absolute deprivation -- is 
generally defined as a psychological state in which there is a perceived negative discrepancy 
between a current position and that which is expected32.  “Relative deprivation” is not reduced 
to perceptions of individual’s deprivation and their corresponding feelings and awareness of it, 
but can develop a collective form of group level deprivation that consists in  a negative gap 
between the group’s current position and attainments and where it is expected  to be.  
 Several theoretical assumptions underlie my discussion of the gender gap in public 
EU-support within the theoretical framework of the RD-theory:  First, women’s and men’s 
attitudes toward the EU primarily depend on how elites and the media frame contentious 
issues of European integration in public discourses. Second, the gender gap in public attitudes 
toward the EU depends on the gender related categories that elites, media and, in particular, 
women’s movements and feminists use in framing their public discourses. Finally, feminist 
critiques of the European Union project provide such gender related frameworks; they 
represent forms of gendered Euro-skepticism that articulate women’s “relative deprivation”, 
projected and attributed on to the process of European unification.  
 Within the theoretical framework of “relative deprivation” and based on these 
assumptions, my account of the gender gap in public EU-support can be developed further. In 
this explanation, feminist “relative deprivation discourses” constitute the core.  Certainly, 
citizens may expect European unification to have a variety of  positive or  negative impacts on 
them individually or collectively. Which of these possible consequences will dominate their 
perceptions, how they will evaluate these impacts, and whether they come to feel them as 
collective or individual “relative deprivation” (RD), depends on a variety of factors.  The 
proposition developed here is that women’s negative or skeptical evaluations of the EU at least 
in part and implicitly rest on such conceptual frameworks that enable them to identify 
women’s collective RD. Feminist scholars and activists in their critical discourses on European 
unification articulated these frameworks more explicitly in public. Thus feminist critiques of 
the EU contributed to making  women either aware of  current impacts of EU-policies that 
provide backlashes to the advancement of women at the national level, or they anticipate 
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 future threats to their attained status in so far as they compare it to that of other 
EU-memberstates, lagging behind in gender equality. The anticipated collective deprivation 
may become manifest and translate into certain political behaviors and forms of collective 
action, as in the case of public referenda campaigns, but it may also largely remain latent and 
become manifest only in survey data responses of women constructing their EU-preferences 
and evaluating the EU-impacts for the purpose of Eurobarometer survey research. 
 
 Summarizing this theoretical account of the EU-gender gap, three propositions that can 
be formulated: 
 1. Feminist discourses and critiques of  the EU articulate motivations for 
Euro-skepticism from the social perspectives of women and gender equality, and they provide 
frameworks for identifying negative gaps between their collective attainments at the national 
level and their future positions; gaps that are attributed as consequences to European 
unification.  
 2. These frameworks are in correspondence with women’s assessments of the EU; 
however, given the gender-neutral approach of Eurobarometer questionnaires so far, this 
correspondence can be documented only partially by the available quantitative survey data33;  
 3. My central prediction is that in a cross-national comparison, the gender gap in public 
EU-support will vary with the extent to which women expect European unification to deprive 
them relatively from what they already have attained at their national or local level. The term 
“relatively” here refers not only to objective status but also to achievements, and includes 
hopes and chances regarding future gains. Important are local and national standards that 
function subjectively as the predominant frames of reference for comparing and assessing 
impacts deriving from the EU.  Feminist EU-critiques and frameworks for women’s relative  
deprivation  
                                                                                                                                                        
32 A.S.R.Manstead/M. Hewstone (eds.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Psychology 1995: 475-477 
33 The standard Eurobarometer reports on public opinion in the EC/EU, since 1973 produced by the European Commission 
twice a year, in general do not present their data broken down by gender. Specific “gender”-topics are however occasionally 
dealt with in special studies; see Commission of the EC: EB 19 “Women and Men of Europe in 1983; The Situation of 
Women, Women and Employment, Their Role in Society”; EB 32 “European Public Opinion on the Family and the Desire 
for Children” (August 1990); EB-Special “Family and Employment within the Twelve” (Dec. 1991); EB 39 “Europeans and the 
Family” (Dec.1993); EB 44.3 “Women and Men in Europe and Equal Opportunities. Results of an Opinion Poll” (March 
1997). 
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  Public discourses in Europe remain largely confined to national elites and mass media. 
Regarding European integration, they differ greatly across EU-memberstates in regard to 
which issues become controversial and which not and how these controversies are framed. In 
the nineties, heated political debates on Europe have developed primarily in those European 
democracies where popular referenda on fundamental questions of national European politics 
were held.34 Among the countries without such direct-democratic institutions, the degree and 
patterns of mass public politicization depended primarily on how political parties articulate 
conflicting interests and frame different views on European integration. During the 1980s, 
public debates on the EC were largely framed by partisan conflict between the Left and the 
Right, such as in Denmark, Great Britain and Greece. Here, a “pronounced tendency for 
partisans of the Left to view the European Community less favorably than do partisans of the 
Right” has been noted (Inglehart/Rabier/Reif 1987: 155). During the mid-nineties, this 
Left-Right ideological dichotomy on European matters has become distinctly blurred: in 
France, the Left joined the extreme Right in endorsing Euro-skeptical positions, while in the 
UK, Labor - and especially New Labor - developed more EU-friendly positions, with the 
Conservatives increasingly more divided and skeptical vis-à-vis the European Union.  
 
 Within the national contexts of public discourses on Europe over the past decades, 
women’s views have become increasingly salient and more explicitly articulated. However, 
there has hardly emerged any universal, cross-national feminist EU-discourse. Despite the 
establishment of women’s networks and lobbies across the EU35,  women’s preferences and 
critiques continue to be articulated and framed largely at the national level. Feminist 
discourses use different terms and set different priorities in response to differing national and 
historical conditions: what “European Union” means for women, appears to vary greatly from 
one country to another. In articulating women’s concerns with and criticisms of European 
integration within national public discourses, female politicians and representatives as well as 
                                               
34 National referenda on the entry into the EU were held in 1994 in Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway,  and referenda on 
the Treaty of the European Union in 1992/1993 in Denmark, Ireland and France. In Denmark, the June 1992 referendum 
failed with 50,7% of the votes cast against the EU-treaty, while the May 1993 referendum succeeded. The September 1992 
referendum in France produced an only very slight majority in favor of the Treaty. In Ireland, in the June 1992 referendum, a 
clear majority of supporters of the EU-treaty (68,7%) emerged.  
– 23 – 
 feminist scholars and publicists have acquired a quintessential role. With their assessments and 
critiques of the EU they have left the more restricted realms and exclusive circles of feminist 
groups and gone public, debating feminist issues and views in the mass media, in parliamentary 
arenas, at party congresses  or in general election campaigns. Occasionally, such as during the 
popular referenda-campaigns in 1992-4, feminist views have even achieved a prominent impact 
on shaping the political agendas. 
 
 In the following I will restrict myself to some of the points feminist EU-critiques have 
made, without claiming in any way to exhaust the variety of concepts, frameworks and 
hypotheses such approaches have developed. What interests me here, are those arguments that 
feminist critiques of the EU have constructed from the point of view of women and that have 
become part of those competing public discourses on Europe in the context of which women’s 
skeptical attitudes toward the EU are formed and have to be interpreted. My contention is 
that within a comparative perspective, the variability of what the EU means to women 
depends, on one hand, from how far feminist critiques of the EU have become “sunken 
cultural capital” in a given society and its public sphere with its competing political discourses; 
and, on the other hand, it depends on how feminist discourses frame their critiques of the EU 
in response to particular historical, political and cultural conditions. Within the controversies 
between alternative political discourses on the EU, feminist critiques provide particular 
repertoires on which women may draw in the processes of framing their interests or 
preferences regarding the issues of European integration. More importantly, however, feminist 
critiques, “in response to historically, politically, and culturally differentiated exigencies and 
the discursive traditions in which they are articulated”, also offer conceptualizations for 
reinterpreting women’s heterogeneous national identities and negotiating them with gender36.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
35 Examples are among others: the “European women’s lobby”; The “European Forum of Left Feminists”; and the “European 
Network of Women”. 
36 This is an interdisciplinary insight I owe to Leslie A. Adelson’s feminist analysis of  how, in the case of West German 
culture of the 1970s and 1980s, the production of gender is “simultaneously and inextricably intertwined with configurations 
of race, nationality, class, ethnicity through which power is manifested ”; see: L. Adelson: “Feminism and German Identity. 
Making Bodies, Making History”, University of  Nebraska Press 1993: XIVf. 
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 I. Reinterpreting the process of European unification 
 Looked at through feminist lenses, the process of European integration appears in a 
different light from that depicted by the dominant theorists that have focused on state actors, 
interest groups and European institutions. Catherine Hoskyns, in her historical account of 
European integration from the point of view of gender, demonstrates that, for instance, the 
social policy initiatives of the EU cannot be explained without taking the activity of social 
movements as political actors into account. She argues that this is particularly true for the 
development of sex equality policy initiatives within the bureaucracy of Brussels which could 
not be accounted for without the impact of women’s organizations and their interactions with 
the feminist branch of the Euro-bureaucracy (Hoskyns 1996).  Beyond her approach of 
reconstructing the process of European integration from the perspective of women’s 
movements, feminist scholars have focused their critiques of the EU around at least five more 
topics in European integration37:  
  
I. Re-assessing the effectiveness of EC-equal opportunity policies. 
 Community publications usually point to an impressive range of policies by which the 
EU has sought to enhance the position of women in member states. Based on the legal norm 
of equal treatment that the treaties of  Rome instituted in 1957, since the mid-seventies the EC 
has adopted more than a dozen directives and regulations on equal treatment, as well as four 
medium term action plans for promoting gender equality since the beginning of the 1980s.38 
Feminist assessments of these advancements are not restricted to discussing deficits and delays 
in the implementation of EC-policies by member states and the lack of enforcement measures 
on the part of the EU. Critics rather develop frameworks based on the categories of inclusion 
and exclusion, focusing on the impact of European integration on groups of women who 
                                               
37 Instead of trying to differentiate here nationally or regionally between varieties of “Mediterranean”, “Continental 
European”, “German”, “Anglo-Saxon” or “Scandinavian” feminist discourses on European integration, I will focus rather on 
the major topics which feminist discourses address, leaving the possibility of cross-regional communication and interaction 
open. 
38 In the self-portrayal of the Commission, the EC since the mid 1970s has become a protagonist in promoting women’s equal 
rights and opportunities throughout Europe: “Important regulations binding for all member states” were adopted and women 
promoting initiatives in educational and professional training undertaken. Among others, EU-publications point out that the 
Maastricht treaty allows for national affirmative action programs (EC-document), not outruling them as an impediment to the 
internal market. Major measures for promoting equal opportunities by the EC/EU are the four “Action Programs” from 
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 remain excluded from the EC’s legal provisions, namely non- working women, women 
working  in the informal economy, or women following as wives their migrant husbands, but 
finding themselves in the host country deprived of legal entitlements and securities they would 
have enjoyed in their home country39. Feminist jurisprudence since the Maastricht treaty have 
started to scrutinize the concept of citizenship that this treaty has introduced as a supposedly 
core-element of European unification, but that – in a feminist perspective - is restricted to a 
notion of equality largely understood in terms of commodification, rather than based on legal 
and social entitlements40. 
 
III. Reevaluating the “other democratic deficit” of the EU  
 Compared to their political and administrative representation in many memberstates, 
women appear to fare better within the European parliament, but not in the Commission.41 
Feminist evaluations of  the decision making structures of the Euro-bureaucracy, of their 
democratic deficits  42 , their lack of public transparency and their fragmentation transcend 
principles such as “liberal representation” and “equal opportunities” as insufficient. They 
rather draw on more egalitarian norms and principles such as “distributional justice”43, 
                                                                                                                                                        
1982, 1986, 1991 and 1996; and “NOW” (New Opportunities for Women) as a EC-program within the structural policies 
domain for promoting women education and employment in regional development.  
39 Imelda Higgins: Equal treatment and national procedural rules: one step forward, two steps back; in Irish journal of 
European law 1995/1: 18-29;  European Women’s Lobby: Confronting the Fortress - Black and Migrant Women in the 
European Community; Luxembourg, European Parliament 1995; Dina Vaiou: Women’s work and everyday life in southern 
Europe in the context of European integration; and Paola Vinay: From Informal Flexibility to the New Organization of 
Time; both in M.D.Garcia-Ramon and Janice Monk (eds.), Women of the European Union. The politics of work and daily 
life; Routledge 1996; Sue Nott, Fiona Beveridge: “Law-making in the European Union: Making Women Count”; paper 
presented at “Feminist Perspectives on International Relations”, Lund University, Sweden, 14-16 June 1996. 
40 See: Elizabeth Meehan, “Citizenship and the European Community”; London, Sage 1993, and id., “Women’s rights in the 
European Community”, in Lewis 1993. 
41 The European Parliament has established a “Standing Committee on Women’s Rights”; and the EC-Commission is dealing 
with women’s affairs within two of its departments/offices: the “Office for Equal Opportunities” within General Direction V 
(Employment, Labour Relations and Social Affairs), and the “Women Information Service” within General Direction X 
(Audiovisual Media, Information, Communication and Culture). But feminist critiques point to the low representation of 
women in higher positions in the central Euro-bureaucracy: in the 3871 top administrative and management positions in the 
Commission, in 1994 only 13.5% women were found; and among the 52 top positions (A1), only one women; see Hoskyns 
1996: 224/5. 
42 Joyce Marie Mushaben: The Other “Democratic Deficit”. Women in the European Community before and after 
Maastricht; in P. M. Luetzeler: Europe after Maastricht. American and European Perspectives; Oxford 1994: 251-277. 
43 Though they see women’s interests in Europe as heterogeneous and pluralistic, German feminist scholars count the 
following losses for women as consequences of European integration:  increase of female unemployment, transformation of 
the labor market with increase of unsecured poorly paid jobs and retrenchment of social securities, and the decline of living 
conditions for women from other cultures, continents and races; see Biester, Holland-Kunz, Jansen, Maleck-Lewy, Ruf, Sauer 
(ed.): Das unsichtbare Geschlecht der Europa. Der europaeische Einigungsprozess aus feministischer Sicht; Frankfurt/M. 
1994: 11ff 
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 “descriptive representation” or “parity democracy”44. At the first European Summit “Women 
in Power” in Athens on November 3, 1992 at the invitation of the Commission of the 
European Communities, Leonor Beleza, vice-president of the Portuguese Parliament, 
articulated such a feminist conception of democracy: “Democracy must not only be pluralist 
but also egalitarian in the sense that the existence of two different, in fact very different, types 
of human beings have to be taken into account. Mankind is made up of people who are either 
men or women, not neutral or asexual beings, and this is a vital component of their 
personality”45. 
 
IV. Recasting the EU’s social dimension and the future of national welfare states 
 Critics have blamed the prevailing neo-liberal strategy of European unification for 
aiming at one single European market for goods, services, labor and capital and at an economic 
and monetary union of Europe, but at the costs of leaving a highly fragmented “social space” 
behind46.  On the other hand, the “Social Protocol” that was added to the Maastricht Treaty 
after the failure of the first Danish referendum, is referred to as a significant case in favor of 
the EU’s consideration for gender equality. Namely its third paragraph is seen as being of 
particular interest to women, stipulating that policy harmonization should not go so far as to 
prevent member states from maintaining or adopting “affirmative action” measures47.  
Feminist sociologists and welfare regime comparativists, however, pointed out the 
contradictions and shortcomings of this construction of  the “Social Europe” as an Illusion or 
Alibi48. They have provided more comprehensive frameworks for reassessing the impacts of 
the Single European Market and of the Maastricht-project from the point of view of women 
                                               
44 Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy; University Park 1991; id., Eliane Vogel-Polsky: La democratie paritaire: vers un 
nouveau contrat social; Actas do Seminario Construir a Igualdade, Lisboa, Portugal, 28-30 May 1992: 53-76;  
45 Women in Decision-Making. Facts and Figures on Women in Political and Public Decision-Making in Europe; ed. by 
European Network of Experts, Brussels 1994(2ed.)  
46 As major analysts of the EU’s “social dimension” argue, social policy for the Union has a “far lower priority than initiatives 
for an integrated market”, and the “social space” remains fragmented, “heavy on symbolism and light on substance”; see 
Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson (eds.): European Social Policy. Between Fragmentation and Integration; Washington 1995: 
47ff.;  Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Economy. The Politics and Economics of Integration; Oxford University Press 
1993: 157-174;   
47 Included were those measures which would make it easier for women to pursue a vocational activity or prevent or 
compensate them for disadvantages in their professional careers, - reasons for the British government to veto the “Social 
Protocol” as an integral part of the Treaty. With the protocol reduced to only an Appendix of the Treaty, the conservative 
government was allowed to sign the treaty, and to “opt out” of the EU’s “social dimension”. 
48 Eliane Vogel-Polsky/Jean Vogel: L’Europe Sociale 1993: Illusion, Alibi ou Realite? Brussels, 1991 
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 and gender. Their analyses of types,  developments and retrenchments of social welfare 
regimes in Europe49 develop frameworks based on the notion of “family” or “woman-friendly” 
welfare regimes50 and classifications of national “gender regimes”51; they study the impact of 
these regimes on particularly weak groups of women52, and they are critically aware of 
controversial case laws of the European Court of Justice on the equal treatment of women and 
men that constrain the Social Protocol provision and put national or local measures for 
promoting women into question53.  
 
V. Reconsidering the impacts of the single market and  of the economic union in the 
context of globalization and  spatial differentiation 
 Feminist analyses critically examine the gender implications of the free movement 
provisions, of the Single European Market, as well as the “convergence criteria” -- required for 
the project of an economic and monetary Union -- by focusing on their impact for women54.  
Among them, feminist geographers challenge the predominantly economist and legalistic 
frameworks that the major discourses on European integration and global economic 
restructuring entail, as well as the macroeconomic policies of unification, for typically 
ignoring the impact of these  processes and policies on family, gender and community 
                                               
49  For a systematic comparisons of the different impacts that welfare state variations have for women and men and their 
relationships in the U.S., UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, see Diane Sainsbury: Gender, equality, and welfare states; 
Cambridge University Press 1996; for theoretical analyses and other cases in Europe, see the two volumes by D. Sainsbury 
(ed.), Gendering Welfare States, 1994; and by Jane Lewis (ed.) Women and Social Policies in Europe 1993; Ilona Ostner and 
Jane Lewis: Gender and the Evolution of European Social Policies; in S. Leibfried and P. Pierson (eds.), European Social 
Policy. Between Fragmentation and Integration; Washington DC, The Brookings Institution 1995:159-193. 
50 See Mary Daly: Comparing Welfare States: Towards a gender friendly approach; in Sainsbury (ed.) 1994; Arnaug Leira: 
“The ‘women friendly’ welfare state? The case of Norway and Sweden”, in Jane Lewis, ed., “Women and Social Policies in 
Europe. Work, Family and the State”, Edward Elgar 1993. For a critical assessment of “Europatriarchy”, see: Susanne 
Schunter-Kleemann, “Herrenhaus Europa” 1993.  
51  “Gender regimes” are defined as constructs at the level of the state, resulting from political struggles and compromises 
between a variety of political actors; they give rise to the specific national patterns of gender relations and divisions, including, 
for instance, horizontal and vertical segregations of the labor market and the pay gaps in the national wage structure; see 
Ostner/Lewis 1995: 161, note 7.  
52 Mary Daly: Europe’s poor women: Gender in research on poverty; European Sociological Review, 1992/8: 1-12 
53 Karin Lundstrom: “Women Caught in a Logical Trap in EC Law: An Analysis of the Use of Quotas in the Case of 
Kalanke”; in “A World in Transition. Feminist Perspectives in International Relations”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift Vol. 
100/1997,1; and for a critical evaluation a report presented by the president of the Labor Law Court of Schleswig 
Holstein/Germany, Ninon Colneric, to the German women’s lobby: “Europa - ein Europa der Frauen?” in Informationen 
fuer die Frau, Informationsdienst des “Deutschen Frauenrates-Lobby der Frauen-Bundesvereinigung Deutscher 
Frauenverbaende und Frauengruppen gemischter Verbaende e.V.”, May 1994: 6-12 
54 See F. Beveridge and S. Nott: Women, Wealth and the Single Market; in D. Mayes (ed.), The Evolution of Rules for a Single 
European Market; Office for Official Publications of the EC 1995; Louise Ackers: Women, citizenship and European 
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 relations.  A particular focus of these studies includes the relationships between context and 
diversity among women. Women’s diversity derive not only from class and ethnicity, but also 
from “geography” and “place in forming contexts and constructing the differing experiences of 
social life”55 .   
 
VI. Revealing the “Sexual Politics of the EU”56
 “Sex equality law” and the “body-politics” of EU-Law have provoked some more 
recent critiques of the EU. Their scope goes furthest beyond the political economy framework 
conventionally characteristic of EU public-policy discussions and they transcend the social 
welfare and political rights frameworks adopted by feminist critiques, too. Feminist and gay 
scholars developed critical assessments of a variety of “body politics” issues underlying the 
interplay of national policies with European Union policies,  including sexual harassment, 
pornography and human rights, sexual trafficking of women in Europe, reproductive 
technologies, abortion rights or violence57.   
 These feminist (and gay-) critiques of the strategies of European unification frame and  
articulate a variety of discourses on “relative deprivation” regarding the present and future 
chances and status of different groups of women in particular, and of gender and family 
relations more in general. They provide norms for evaluating the institutional practices of the 
EU other than the functional criteria used in the prevailing political economic analyses of 
European policy making.  As theorists of relative deprivation have pointed out: not all 
discrepancies between expectations and attainments would generate feelings of deprivation - 
some sense of entitlement is required to create a perception of injustice about the size of the 
discrepancy. Some of the feminist discourses articulate and develop normative claims of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Community law: the gender implications of the free movement provisions; in Journal of social welfare and family law 1994/4: 
391-406 
55 See Garcia-Ramon and Monk, eds. 1996; this volume includes studies on the geography of gender and welfare in Europe, a 
number of them focusing on southern Europe, in the context of European integration. 
56 see R. Amy Elman (ed.), Sexual Politics and the European Union. The New Feminist Challenge; Berghahn Books  1996, 
including feminist studies by scholars from Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the UK and the U.S. 
57 T.K. Hervey and D.O’Keeffe (eds.), Sex Equality Law in the European Union; John Wiley, Chichester 1996; Leo Flynn: 
Marketing the Union: Some Feminist Perspectives; in: “A World in Transition. Feminist Perspectives on International 
Relations”, Stratsvetenskaplig Tidskrift vol.100, 1997,1 
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 entitlements related to women’s rights and gender equality, thus providing a framework based 
on distinctions of “just” and “unjust” institutional practices and distributional consequences58.  
 
Women’s “relative deprivation” in the EU: a classification of memberstates 
 In the following, my ambition will remain constrained to less than testing the 
propositions outlined above systematically by means of analyzing quantitative empirical 
survey data. Instead, I will limit myself to providing some more interpretive illustrations for 
my “relative deprivation” account of the EU-gender gap by analyzing a few cases more in 
depth. In doing so, I will try to render my theoretical argument more concrete by illuminating 
some of  the specific meanings and motivations underlying women’s Euro-skepticism. For 
selecting those cases that appear most interesting for such case studies, I will develop first a 
classification of all EU-memberstates, based on the theoretical framework developed above.  
 The “relative deprivation” framework suggests to classify EU-memberstates according 
to two variables: the present structural position of women at the national level, measured by 
the gender development index (high, medium, low level); and the degree to which feminist 
discourses on the EU shape women’s expectations regarding the future impact of EU politics, 
measured by the diffusion of feminist values at the national level.  Both variables produce a 
matrix with different categories, the most extreme ones being the following: 
I.  Memberstates where a “critical mass” of women expects European unification to deprive 
them relatively from what they have achieved at the national or local level, with objectively 
advanced standards of gender equality, and publicly developed feminist discourses critical of 
the EU with a significant impact on public opinion; 
II.  Memberstates where a sizable proportion of women perceive the EU to “relatively 
deprive” them from attainments at the national level, and where, although the level of gender 
equality is still relatively low, feminist critiques of the EU succeed in shaping public discourses 
to some extent.  
III.  Memberstates where women are not aware of any significant “relative deprivation” 
deriving from the EU, where gender equality has reached objectively high standards or is 
                                               
58 W. G. Runciman argued that only those discrepancies between expectations and attainments would generate feelings of 
deprivation where some sense of entitlement is present to create a perception of injustice about the size of the discrepancy; see 
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 significantly improving, and where feminist values are relatively diffused throughout public 
discourses. Here women obviously see their feminist expectations progressively fulfilled, 
either by national governments or as a result of EU-policies, without further European 
integration being perceived as a threat for gender advancement at the national level. 
 
IV.  Memberstates where women do not feeling any collective “relative deprivation”, under 
conditions of low levels of gender advancement, and in the context of persisting traditional 
and masculine values, which allow feminist critiques only to exercise a marginal impact on 
public discourses. 
 By using  these four categories as well as the data included in table 2 and table 3 above, 
we obtain a four-fold matrix with a classification of the fifteen EU-memberstates (see table 5). 
Assuming the premises of the “relative deprivation” theory outlined above, we would expect 
the EU-gender gap to be largest in those countries subsumed under the I. category (Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Greece); we would predict a medium range 
EU-gender gap for the countries included within the II. category (France, Austria, Germany, 
UK, Ireland, Spain); and we would expect the gap to be relatively smallest in the memberstates 
in the III. category (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands).  
 The comparison of these theoretical predictions with the actual cross-national 
variations of gender disparities in the EU in 1994 (see table 1), provides a preliminary and, 
within the boundaries of the available data here, limited test of the “relative deprivation” 
theory of the EU-gender gap59: The predictions match with the available data in seven of our 
fifteen cases, namely in three of the five cases in which we expected a high gender gap 
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark); in four of the seven cases where we predicted gender disparities 
of a medium size (Finland, Germany, the UK, and Ireland); and in none of the four cases 
where we expected relatively smallest gender gaps. The predictions do not hold in seven cases, 
where either the actual gender gaps were smaller than expected (Spain and the Netherlands), or 
where the gender disparities were larger than predicted (France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, 
                                                                                                                                                        
W.G.Runciman: Relative deprivation and social justice, London 1966 
59 I am using here EB-data on gender disparities limited to one survey (Fall 94) only. 
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 Portugal). For Greece, because of a gap in the World Values Survey, we were not able to test 
the theory. 
Table 5:   
Classification of EU-memberstates: women’s achieved status and feminist positions60  
E: feminist positions I. high II. medium III. low 
high 
 achieved national status      
Sweden 
 
Norway 
Denmark 
 
Finland 
 
 
France 
 
Germany 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 
 
 
Belgium 
Italy 
                                                                              
low 
 
 
Greece 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
 
Spain 
 
 
Portugal 
Note: underlined cases confirm the gender gap-predictions. 
 
 In the remaining part of this paper, I will examine some cases more in depth, cases 
selected either because they confirm our theoretical expectations, or because they appear as 
“outliers” and we can hope to illuminate some of the reasons for their “deviance” by an in 
depth analysis. 
 
“Relative deprivation” and the EU-gender gap: the cases of Denmark and Greece 
                                               
60 In this matrix, the vertical axis is constituted by “achieved national status” measured by the “gender development index”, 
with data from the UN 1995 (see table 2, above), and the horizontal axis by “feminist critiques” regarding the EU, measured 
by the diffusion of feminist values, with data from the 1990/11 World Value Survey (see table 3, above). 
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  Denmark stands as a paradigmatic case among the Scandinavian countries with their 
high levels of gender disparities characteristic of public orientations toward the EU: although, 
through the lenses of the theory of relative deprivation, we would have expected  a high 
gender gap within the Danish public anyhow, the available EB-data show a level of disparities 
(16,5% in Fall 1994) that make Denmark the most extreme case. Greece, on the other hand, 
with its low level of gender equality may appear as a paradigmatic example for the traditional 
gender gap hypotheses, with women being apolitical or more conservative. But in fact, during 
the past two decades, feminist values and a rapid politicization of mass publics, among others 
on  the highly controversial issue of European politics, have changed the political culture and 
have mobilized critical masses of women in Greece, too. 
 
The case of Denmark 
 Denmark became a member of the EC in 1973. It belongs to the small group of Nordic 
countries in which the advancement of economic and social gender equality worldwide has 
reached the top61: in 1994, 69% of Danish women were economically active and earned 40% of 
the national income; women held a third of the seats in the national parliament and 43% of 
the Danish representatives in the European parliament were women (Hoskyns 1996: 222). 
Along with Sweden, Norway and Finland, in Denmark social welfare entitlements of women, 
their political empowerment, feminist consciousness and leftist orientations toward the EU are 
most developed.   
 At the same time, Denmark shows the highest gender gap scores in EU-support: in the 
1994-EB survey, only 22% of the women identified themselves as “hard core supporters” of the 
EU, as compared to nearly 40% of the men. In a Danish political culture that has been 
characterized as on the edge of “postmodernism”, gender equality has advanced to such a 
degree, that the “traditional” gender bias hypotheses for explaining female Euro-skepticism 
nowhere holds less than in the Danish case: In 1992 and in 1993, women as well as men, if not 
                                               
61 The UN-Human Development Report for 1995 ranks Denmark, after Sweden, Finland and Norway worldwide fourth, 
both with regard to its socioeconomic “gender related development” and to its political-economic “gender empowerment 
measure”, defined by seats held by women in parliament, in administration and management, share of professional and 
technical workers and earned income share of women (UN 1995: 76; 84). 
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 more, mobilized in the two referenda on the Maastricht-treaty, the first of which failed62. 
Thanks to the  public controversies between supporters and opponents of the EU and the 
broad media coverage, Danes can be considered as belonging to the best informed citizens in 
matters regarding the EU. This allowed a compact block of EU-opponents to emerge that did 
not want to delegate to Brussels a part of their national sovereignty and identity. Indeed, an 
overproportionate group of 56% of the Danes reported in 1995 feeling a Danish national 
identity only - as compared to only 40% of all European citizens (EB1996: 36). In this 
opposition block, doubting women played the decisive role in tipping the balance.  
 Danish feminist scholars explained the female skepticism toward the EU as resulting 
from their concerns about the welfare state and democracy: The situation and future of the 
Nordic welfare states became central topics of public debates in Denmark as well as in the 
Scandinavian countries. In November 1995, the “Danish Center for Information on Women 
and Gender” (KVINFO) held a public conference under the title “Women’s perspectives on 
Europe, Visions and Skepticism”, with the aim “to establish a dialogue between European 
feminists…and an engaged Danish audience on the visions and the skepticisms for the future of 
Europe and the EU”63. Central discussion themes were questions such as: “Does the model of 
the ‘Nordic Welfare State’ still exist, is it worthwhile exporting to other countries - and will it 
survive in the further development of the European Union?”64
 Regarding the issue of democracy in the EU, the Danish feminist researcher Drude 
Dahlerup pointed out “that the influence of women in the creation of today’s and tomorrow’s 
European and international relations is minimal, compared to what we are used to in the 
Nordic countries”; and Karen Siune summarized Danish women’s central demands: openness 
of all political EU-decisions, decisions to be taken primarily in Denmark; popular influence on 
decision making, among others by popular referenda65.  Another Danish feminist scholar 
                                               
62 After the failure of the first Maastricht referendum in 1992, and in order to motivate the Danish electorate to vote 
positively in the second referendum, all Danish parties compromised to make the EC-Council introduce into the treaty a 
special opt-out clause for Denmark, specifically with regard to the Danish discontent with the monetary union, the defense 
union and the EU-citizenship. 
63 Anne-Marie Eriksen, Bettina Laursen (KVINFO): Women’s perspectives on Europe, Visions and Skepticism; Paper 
presented at the interdisciplinary Conference “A World in Transition. Feminist Perspectives on International Relations”, 
Lund University, Sweden, 14-16 June 1996: 1 
64 See: KVINFO: “Kvindeoffentlighed I Europa”, ed. by Elisabeth Moller Jensen, Henriette Rald, Anne-Marie Eriksen, 
Copenhagen 1996.  
65 Id., p. 50ff. And 20ff. 
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 described the fear of Danish women of being deprived within the EU-institutions of the 
agenda-setting power that they enjoyed at the national level: Women would feel an 
“alienation” “in a male dominated political system in which male dominance increases the 
more centralized the structures are”66. This interpretation is enhanced by the image that 
Danish women politicians convey in public about their political role: “We feel that the image 
we project is one of changing the political agenda such that issues of relevance to women are 
given higher priority. Also we wish to change the ways in which political work is organized, 
e.g. with meeting hours that are convenient for women.” (IPU 1992: 168).  
 Female representation in Denmark is not conceived as merely “symbolic” but as 
performing instrumental functions and having practical impacts. This image of the role of 
women in politics that political parties project for their electorates implies that women are 
needed as vote getters. As their attained status and power position in national politics 
constitutes Danish women’s predominant frame of reference, it enhances as well women’s 
generalized political expectations in regard to European politics. At the European level, 
however, these expectations meet with dissatisfaction to the degree to which the Danish 
electorate compares the EU’s performance on women’s and gender issues to the highly visible 
and participatory role that women have come to play and the impact they have achieved in 
Danish politics.  
 If there are, hence, gender specific differences in political behavior in Danish mass 
publics that account for women’s larger Euro-skepticism, these do not originate from 
women’s traditionally apolitical attitudes but rather from their feminist bias. The World 
Values Survey of 1990/91 reported that Danes ranked second after Swedes with regard to 
feminist attitudes: 44% of Danes identified themselves as feminists, and another 41% as 
“potential feminists”.  What European Integration means to Danish women and men, hence, 
has to be interpreted clearly in the framework of a political culture that is strongly 
characterized by entrenched feminist values that furthermore have become firmly 
institutionalized, including an equal status body at the top national level67.  
 
                                               
66 Elisabeth Moeller-Jensen, in: R. Wolff: “Dann stehen wir in Europa ganz allein”; in TAZ, May 4, 1993: 133  
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 The case of Greece 
 Although Greece and Denmark share a large gender gap in public support for the 
European Union, the two countries could hardly be located at more distant ends of the scale 
of gender inequalities within the European Union: Greek women have remained much more 
excluded from politics at the national as well as at the supranational level, with only a few 
local and institutional advancements: Structural gender relations in Greece largely conform to 
the traditional image. A member of the EC only since 1981, Greece in many respects still 
evidences the image of a patriarchal political culture with women being rather alienated from 
national and international politics: On the UN - gender equality index, Greece ranked on the 
bottom of  the scale at 27, followed only by Spain and Portugal. Regarding the female share of 
earned income, adult literacy rate, life expectancy and level of education, Greece scores lowest 
in the EU, too (UN 1995: 76). Greece belongs to the group of the Mediterranean and mostly 
Catholic societies in Europe where family values and traditional gender roles remain 
strongest68.  
 Despite  the government’s progressive public policies for women over the last decade, 
Greek women continue to suffer from the – in a EU-comparison -- lowest level of 
parliamentary representation and administrative participation in political decision-making at 
the national as well as at the international level69: “The reforms undertaken during the last 
decade for the promotion of gender equality in Greece have not sufficiently modified the 
values, customs and attitudes so as to transform gender role expectations and the belief that 
political affairs are a male responsibility” (UN 1991: 25)70: Power relations within the parties - 
whether socialist or liberal-conservative - despite their official ideologies and because of their 
patronage structures do not favor the election of women to European, national, regional or 
                                                                                                                                                        
67 For an account of “State feminism” in Denmark, see Anette Borchorst: A Political Niche: Denmark’s Equal Status Council , 
in D. McBride Stetson and A. Mazur (eds.), Comparative State Feminism, Sage 1995: 59-75 
68 In Greece by 1990, the literacy rate for women was with 76% much lower than that for men (93%) and women represented 
only 25% of the economically active population (Cacoullos 1994: 312).  
69 Political representation of women in the Greek Parliament is the lowest in EU memberstates (5.3% in 1994); for the 
European Parliament only one women (4.6%) in 1989 and four (16%) in 1994 got elected - only Italy (10%) and Portugal (8%) 
showed lower rates of female representation (Hoskyns 1996: 222). 
70 Reforms of  women’s rights and policies were largely a result of Greece’s application for membership in the EC which 
required that Greece ratify the international conventions on women’s rights (Cacoullos 1994: 314). The reforms included the 
introduction of the principle of equality of the sexes and of the right to equal pay for work of equal value irrespective of sex 
into the new constitution of 1975; the 1983 reform of the archaic family law, the 1984 reform of the penal code regarding 
sexual violence and rape and the 1986 liberalization of the abortion law (id.: 315ff.). 
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 local bodies. The UN-report “Women in decision-making in Greece” (1991) concluded that “a 
traditional sexual division of labor” on public issues persists: “Local and community concerns 
are culturally considered more appropriate for women’s skills and experience Issues relating to 
the national economy, banking and finance, agriculture, foreign affairs, defense and diplomacy 
are the exclusive domain of men” (id.: 26).  These findings apparently support the view that 
Greek women are considerably less supportive of the EU (35.1%) than Greek men (46.4%) 
because a female lack of interest in national and international politics. 
 The Greek women’s movement and national opinion studies provide evidence that 
puts the traditional gender gap hypothesis strongly into doubt. Although the women’s 
movement that emerged in the late seventies never grew as strong as in other European 
countries, feminist activists - through party patronage - have been able to join public 
institutions and have become state feminists or even activists in European institutions71. Apart 
from this group of highly visible elite feminists, also middle and lower class women -- 
especially those actively participating in the labor market – have indicated in a nation wide 
survey of 1988 their high levels of interest in politics and they have demonstrated a wide range 
of efforts to become politically informed (Cacoullos 1994: 321). However, in 1994 only 25% of  
Greek women above the age of 15 were economically active, and feminist activists have thus 
been reduced to highly educated women in the two cities of Saloniki and Athens. Hence, in 
purely quantitative terms, the number of women interested in politics in general and in 
European integration in particular appears rather limited.  
 Why was it then that 10% of Greek women less than men firmly supported the 
European Union in 1994? In the perspective of the “relative deprivation” theory, a response to 
this question has to point out what – in the eyes of critical masses of women -- Greek 
governments since Greece’s transition to democracy (1974), and especially the Socialist 
PASOK-governments (1981-1989; 1993-95) have achieved for them. Studies on the Greek 
retarded Social Welfare State development show that more than in other West European 
states, public expenditures for social policies in Greece have increased during the 1980s and in 
the mid-1990s again, reaching 27,7% (1995) of the state budget, hence two points more than on 
                                               
71 Sissy Vovou: “Selana” fuer Frauen und Kommunikation”, in “TAZ”, March 8, 1994: 14 
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 EU-average72. While in other EU-memberstates welfare state policies stagnated or suffered 
reductions, the PASOK-governments with large efforts continued to boost national welfare 
and social security expenditures, with programs including national health care reform, 
increases of the minimum wage, the improvement of poor relief measures, the creation of 
public services for the elderly and sick; and the institutionalization of child care facilities.  
Many if not most of these national public policies have benefited especially non-working 
women, poor, old or sick women or mothers of small children. With regard to the impact of 
European integration on the EU, Athina-Sofia Kasimatis in her study of the development of 
Greek social policy argues that  the “pressure to fulfill …the conditions for joining the 
Economic and Monetary Union, do not permit a great optimism” or even a “positive 
prediction for the Greek system of social security” (id.: 66).  This evaluation suggests to 
assume also for the case of Greece that women’s relatively higher Euro-skepticism is related to 
negative expectations and fears to be deprived by the EU of some of their attainments and 
improvements that they have come to enjoy at the national level only recently73.  
 
Deviating from the “relative deprivation” model? Spain, Finland, France, Belgium and Italy 
 While Denmark and Greece in 1994 showed the largest gender gaps in EU-support 
among all memberstates, Spain belonged with the Netherlands to the two cases with most 
marginal gender disparities between supporters of the EU. However, bearing the relatively 
sizable diffusion of feminist values, the development of gender equality policies and of 
“women’s policy machineries” in Spain in mind74, we would expect a gender gap of at least 
medium proportions  -- with between 5-10, instead of only 3.9 points -- to develop in Spain. 
Given the strong socioeconomic and cultural gender inequalities characteristic of Iberian 
societies, and taking the diffusion of feminist values into account, it appears a puzzle that 
women in Spain, unlike Greek women, are not more Euro-skeptic than their male 
                                               
72 A.S.Kasimatis: Die Entwicklung der griechischen Sozialpolitik seit 1967; MA-thesis, Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft, 
Universitaet Heidelberg, Januar 1997: 37 
73 With 53% of Greeks identifying exclusively with their Greek nationality and only 3% considering themselves as European 
only or as both, European and Greek (EB44 1996: 36), it could be assumed that women because of their traditionally stronger 
national identity do not support European integration.  
74 In the 1990/1 World Value Survey, 36% of all interviewed Spaniards showed feminist orientations; for the “Women’s Policy 
Machinery” in the case of Spain see: Celia Valiente, Paper presented at the APSA Meeting, San Francisco, Aug. 29-Sept.1, 
1996. 
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 compatriots. If these “deviations” are not the result of measurement error or of singular, 
situational factors, how could they be explained theoretically?  
 An explanation of the Spanish case should consider that the overall public support for 
European integration in Spain is not even half as strong as in Greece. The extremely low level 
of EU-support found in Spain in the mid-1990s75 could be interpreted as a persistent 
manifestation of the generally low political interest prevailing in Spain as a result of its late 
democratization and its late entry into the EC. In this view, not only women but also men 
have remained weakly interested in politics and less active in political participation. The 
empirical evidence for this argument of a generalized political de-alignment in Spain is based 
on at least three findings: 1. Without any compulsory electoral participation - as in Greece -, 
electoral turnouts in Spain with 50%- 60% are considerably lower than in other European 
states; 2. The share of those Spaniards engaging in forms of political participation other than 
in voting is with one third much smaller than in any other West European country (Topf, in 
Klingemann/Fuchs (eds.) 1995: 69); 3. While more than 60% of Greeks identified weakly and 
around 30% strongly with political parties, in Spain the shares were only around 40% and 15% 
respectively (Klingemann/Fuchs (eds.) 1995: 105); three quarters of Spaniards felt not 
integrated or did not identify with or did not maintain pragmatic relations with any party, and 
could thus be classified as de-aligned (Klingemann/Fuchs 1995: 213).  
 These findings76 have some implications for explaining the Spanish “deviance”: within a 
context of general de-alignment, it can be assumed that gender differences will not be as highly 
pronounced as in a highly party-politicized context, like in Greece. However, this assumption 
cannot explain the puzzle of why the issue of the EU - at least by 1994 - has not entailed a 
gendered debate or a gendering of public orientations toward the EU in Spain. Pilar del 
Castillo in her analysis of elections for the European Parliament in Spain makes an argument 
that helps to better understand why Spain is different from Greece and Denmark: 
                                               
75 This low EU-support is striking because the general wisdom holds that the Spanish attitude toward Europe is more positive 
than that expressed by the other memberstates; see Marisa Muga: La Opinion de los Espanoles sobre la Union Europea; 
European Commission, DGX, July 1996: p. 4. But here, only the “hard core” supporters are considered that respond to all 
four support-questions positively: While in 1994 nearly 80% of Spanish men and 75% of women responded to be in favor of 
the EU, only 36%/30% believed Spain had benefited from the EU, and only 50%/46% felt, integration was a good thing.  
76 An exception from the pattern described for Spain are the “autonomous communities” of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country where anti-centralist attitudes since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1976 were linked to 
pro-Europeanism, where gender relations are more advanced and politicization and party political alignment more developed. 
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 Membership of the EC in Spain has acquired an aura, she argues, “suggesting benefits in 
political, economic and social terms that were not  questioned”; this explains why “neither 
Spanish membership of the EC nor EC policies have been a matter of inter-party conflict”77.  
 Can we generalize these findings from Spain and apply them to the other deviant cases? 
The Netherlands is a second test case where we could test the hypothesis that an absence of 
inter-party conflict on EU-issues has contributed to keeping the gender gap in public 
EU-support moderate, although - from the “relative deprivation” perspective - we had 
expected it to be relatively larger. Also the reversal of this explanation should be tested in the 
cases of Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal: was it here the relatively more intense 
inter-party conflict on EU-issues that enhanced and furthered a gender gap that – from our 
theoretical deprivation perspective - we would have expected to be less pronounced? The 
plausibilty of these hypotheses in the four cases not withstanding - an empirical test remains 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Conclusions 
 As I have argued, we cannot reduce the gender gap in public support for the EU across 
memberstates to a “typically female” deficit in political interest and information, or to 
women’s stronger conservative political orientations. As comparative analyses of gender and 
mass public attitudes/behavior demonstrate, neither have Marita Rosch Inglehart’s (1991) and 
other’s expectations come true: although socio-economic and political inequalities between 
men and women are decreasing, the impact of gender as an independent variable did not 
decrease but continues to correlate with differences in individuals’ political attitudes and 
behaviors. None of the approaches for explaining the dynamics of European public opinion 
has explicitly referred so far to gender - although the mounting feminist critiques of European 
integration and the persisting or even growing gender disparities in European mass public 
orientation strongly suggest to do so. Public opinion analysts such as Karlheinz Reif, Richard 
Sinnott, Oskar Niedermayer, Russell J. Dalton, Richard Eichenberg, Ronald Inglehart and 
others have conceived changes in European public orientations within a gender neutral 
                                               
77 Pilar del Castillo: Spain, A Dress Rehearsal for the National Elections; in Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin (eds.), 
Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union; Ann Arbor 1996: 253 
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 framework. By exploring the novel and paradoxical findings regarding the EU-gender gap in 
this study, I have attempted to show how the gender variable could be more systematically 
incorporated into a framework for analyzing comparatively European public opinion. 
 
 Summarizing my interpretation of the origins of the EU-gender gap, I will conclude 
with the hypothesis that the “relative deprivation” that feminist EU-critiques articulate and for 
which they charge the particular forms and strategies of European integration, necessarily 
adopts a variety of meanings in various EU-memberstates and for different groups of women. 
Although the data on public attitudes toward the EU that I have presented here demonstrate 
that gender specific differences are significant in almost all member countries, the “EU-gender 
gap” by no means indicates an integrated, monolithic female block or a coherently “different 
voice” of women: First of all, national differences, and variable resources continue to impede 
“the construction of a common interest for European women”78; second: for those women 
who are skeptical or opposed against European unification, feminist EU-critiques represent 
only part of a spectrum of public discourses that compete in framing citizen’s orientations 
toward the EU; and, finally, the proportion of men who support feminist, gender-equality and 
family-friendly values, is so substantial that also critical masses of men could be assumed to 
frame their Euro-skepticism, at least partially, in the feminist terms of “relative deprivation”. 
Given that the EU assumes such a variety of meanings, the gendering of European public 
opinion should not be misinterpreted as a Europe-wide new gender cleavage structuring 
European politics and policy-making.  But neither do my findings support the 
“Janus-Face”-image of gender politics and policies in the EU, implying that what for a 
majority of women in some traditional countries may appear as a progress, for women in the 
most gender advanced memberstates must mean a step backwards.  My scrutiny of the 
correlation between gendered skepticism toward the EU, national attainments of gender 
equality and feminist expectations toward the EU has rather confirmed that the “fault-line” 
between more advanced and more backward gender regimes is not the decisive variable for 
explaining the dynamics of the EU-gender gap. What counts more in shaping public gender 
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 disparities is how feminist discourses are able to articulate their critiques of the EU within the 
context of inter-party conflict and public controversies on issues of European integration: (1) 
then a large EU-gender gap will emerge in countries where the EU is perceived as depriving 
women of their social and political achievements (Denmark and Greece); (2) by contrast, the 
gender-gap in public orientations toward the EU will be smallest in societies where the impact 
of feminist discourses on public opinion remains limited because of a lack of public inter-party 
controversies on issues regarding European politics (Spain).  
 Despite its heterogenous meanings, the EU-gender gap -- in the perspective of the 
theory of relative deprivation -- appears simple and unified with regard to its underlying 
motivation structure: women’s widespread perceptions or fears of being “relatively deprived” 
of what they have, or at least believe to have achieved at the national level through European 
integration. But at the same time the gender gap in EU-support remains complex and 
heterogeneous as long as women frame and assess their “relative” deprivation by different 
frameworks and standards of critique. The EU-gender gap appears uniform and fragmented at 
once. 
 The ongoing debates about the “social dimension” of the EU, the conflictive question 
of  how to democratize the Euro-Polity, and the quest for “deepening” the EU by 
strengthening supranational prerogatives can be expected to continue to provide fertile ground 
also for feminist critiques of the EU and for their framing of women’s “relative deprivation”. 
If these conditions persist, the gender gap in public support for European integration can be 
expected to deepen further in the future. On the other hand, feminist critiques are but one of 
many competing discourses within the national and European public spheres. Divided among 
themselves and relying on different paradigms, they do not necessarily agree on the 
importance of political or social citizenship, equality or difference; paritarian democracy or 
political representation for the development of the Euro-polity. But all have in common that, 
on differing normative grounds, they provide alternatives to the “liberal”, “functional”, 
“political economic”, formal-legal logics underlying most analyses of European integration and 
that, so far, share “gender neutral” premises. 
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  The analysis offered here has identified some of the gendered manifestations of 
Euro-skepticism during the 1990s, and it has taken not more than a step in sketching out its 
motivations. There remain considerable gaps in our knowledge to fill and for qualitative and 
quantitative research to develop. Apart from comparative analyses of gender specific survey 
data other than those used here, also qualitative case studies of how critical discourses on the 
EU become articulated with mass public opinion, and comparisons of how feminist norms 
and values have contributed to change the political orientations and attitudes of women and 
men toward the nation state and the EU newly appear on the research agenda. Compared to 
conventional mass public opinion studies, the discourse approach toward public opinion 
analysis proposed here operates on different premises. Transcending the gender neutral 
assumptions of the former and incorporating controversial normative issues related to gender, 
it yields different perspectives and innovative insights into the meanings and dynamics of 
Euro-skepticism. 
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